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by Dennis J. Snower 
 
1. Introduction  
 
  This paper examines the key issues underlying the formulation of employment 
policies in advanced industrialised countries, and provides an assessment of these 
policies.  
  The paper begins from first principles: Its point of departure is the idea - a 
commonplace in economic theory, but commonly ignored in the design and 
implementation of policy - that the case for employment policy rests squarely on the 
existence of inefficiencies or inequities. In the absence of one or the other of these 
problems, there is no reason for the government to intervene in the labour market - 
regardless of what the unemployment rate is. In other words, the existence of high 
unemployment, by itself, is no reason for government policy to stimulate employment. 
It is only when such unemployment is demonstrably wasteful of the economy's 
resources or inequitable in the resulting distribution of income and wealth, that there 
is a potential case for government intervention. And this potential case becomes actual 
only once it can be shown that the government failures associated with corrective 
action are likely to fall short of the market failures and inequities to be corrected. 
Furthermore, examining these market failures and inequities in the labour market is an 
important undertaking because it provides guidelines for the appropriate policy 
responses. This is the subject of Section 2.  
    These issues are so critical in providing a basis for employment policy 
formulation and so frequently ignored in policy making, that they are treated at length. 
Perhaps the most important potential role of these issues is to suggest an appropriate 
overall policy stance. For example, the UK Conservative governments in the 1980s 
and 90s and, to a somewhat lesser degree, the current Labour government have often CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     2 
tended to see many active labour market policies as superfluous - possibly even 
harmful - in an economic environment conducive to competition and free market 
incentives. Consequently these governments - particularly the Conservative ones - 
have often concentrated removing labour market rigidities, viz., reducing the value of 
unemployment benefits, tightening eligibility requirements for these benefits, reducing 
the power of labour unions, and dismantling labour market regulations. Thus, a 
reduced reliance on passive labour market policies was combined with the limited use 
of active labour market policies, as last resort in the face of high unemployment and 
considerable political pressure.  
   The analysis in this paper suggests that this approach is appropriate in the 
absence of major market failures or major inequities under free enterprise. In the 
presence of market failures of the sort described in the next section - particularly ones 
that dwarf the government failures associated with the policies to correct the market 
failures - this stance is seriously misguided, for then free enterprise is wasteful of the 
economy's resources and employment policies may reduce this waste. Besides, 
significant inequalities of opportunity in the labour market may call for policy 
intervention regardless of labour market inefficiencies.  
   On the other hand, the analysis here also suggests that high and persistent 
unemployment, by itself, is not a sufficient reason for government intervention in the 
labour market. Only the presence of inequities or market failures in excess of 
government failures are reliable criteria for this issue. It is on these accounts that the 
material in Section 2 provides an essential underpinning for employment policy 
formulation. 
  Section 3 then formulates the central policy problems in formulating measures 
to stimulate employment and create greater equality of opportunity in the labour 
market. On this basis, it examines the major recent reforms in the light of the 
underlying problems.  
2. Market Failures Relevant to Employment Policies  
   Free enterprise in the labour market leads to efficient economic activity only 
when people are compensated for all the gains and losses they impose on others. 
Specifically, when all benefits and costs are compensated, free market activity ensures CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     3 
that people engage in production and exchange until it is impossible to make anyone 
better off without making someone else worse off. It is clear why this is so. When 
people have to pay for all the costs they impose on others and when they get paid for 
all the benefits, then their own selfish objectives will necessarily coincide with those 
of society at large. After all, if you harm someone else, you yourself will then have to 
pay the damage; and if you benefit someone else, you yourself will be compensated. 
Under these circumstances, people will behave in a socially responsible way simply by 
pursuing their own private ends. Free enterprise will then not only permit the people 
who buy and sell from one another to make each other better off, but it will also 
ensure that there are no socially undesirable effects on third parties as result.   
   But this is not necessarily what happens under free enterprise in the labour 
market. It is instructive to examine how and why it fails to happen, for much 
employment policy is meant to correct the resulting inefficiencies. Clearly, the 
inefficiencies must be identified before sensible policies can be formulated to correct 
them. This point would be too obvious to deserve further attention if it were not so 
frequently ignored in the policy making process. In practice, glaring market failures 
often go unnoticed, while employment policies are frequently implemented in areas 
where the labour market is functioning perfectly well. The resulting social cost is 
undoubtedly high.   
   Let us begin by considering a particularly instructive unemployment problem.  
2a. Viewing Unemployment in Terms of Market Failures 
    When the unemployment rate is high, employed workers tend to be 
substantially better off than their unemployed counterparts. There are many solid free-
market reasons why this should be so: Employers may offer high wages to motivate 
their employees to work hard, to discourage them from quitting, and to attract the best 
candidates in the job market. Or the high wages may be the result of union activities 
or all sorts of pressures that the incumbent workers are able put on their employers.  
   Whatever the reason, when a firm hires unemployed workers, they usually 
experience a significant rise in their incomes. These workers will spend little, if any, 
of this extra income on the products of their own firm, but will buy a whole range of 
goods from other firms. These other firms consequently experience a rise in their sales 
and their profits. If the improvement is sufficiently large, they may find it worthwhile CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     4 
to hire workers themselves who, in turn, will spend their incomes on the products of 
other firms, thereby creating a chain reaction of increases in profits and wage incomes.  
   There is an important moral to this story. When the initiating firm hired some 
unemployed workers, it conferred benefits on other firms and other workers, but the 
beneficiaries did not have to compensate the firm for them. There is no feasible 
economic or legal mechanism for withholding the gains from the beneficiaries unless 
they compensate the initiating firm. As result, something important doesn't get paid 
for.  
   Since the original firm is not compensated, it makes its hiring decision only 
with reference to the profits that it alone can achieve; it has no incentive to take the 
benefits to others into account. All the other firms are in the same position. Whenever 
the private gain from employing people is less than the overall social gain, then free 
enterprise leads firms - as if by an Invisible Hand - to employ fewer workers than 
would be socially desirable. There is, in short, a "market failure", a failure of 
individualistic activity in unfettered markets to make people as well off as they can be.  
   So what is to be done? First it must decide whether to tackle the market 
failure by eliminating the market, or to keep working within the system of voluntary 
exchange. Given the information, co-ordination, and motivation problems that I have 
already mentioned, the large-scale central planning that would be required to eliminate 
unemployment does not seem terribly attractive. The chances are that it would simply 
replace the market failure by an even bigger planning failure.  
    The alternative is to retain the advantages of voluntary exchange, but to 
redirect the incentives that buyers and sellers face. There are various options:  
 
- Should unemployment benefits be raised, so as to compensate the victims of this 
misfunction of free enterprise?  
- Or should unemployment benefits be reduced, so as to give the unemployed workers 
a greater incentive to seek jobs and thereby reduce the unemployment rate?  
- Or should the government increase its spending on the firms' products, so as to 
induce the firms to hire more workers?  
- Or should firms be compensated for the benefits that their hiring activity confers on 
others, say, by a reduction in the relevant payroll tax or by a marginal employment 
subsidy?  CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     5 
 
   Each of these policies, and many more, have indeed been proposed at one 
time or another. What is particularly interesting about looking at unemployment from 
the vantage point of uncompensated benefits is that it suggests which policy is 
potentially appropriate. For the particular unemployment problem above, there is only 
one, namely, the last.  
   The reason is straightforward. In the above account, the unemployed workers 
aren't helping or hurting anyone else; so there is no case for either increasing or 
decreasing unemployment benefits. There is only one missing compensation in this 
unemployment problem, and that is that firms do not get compensated for the profit 
and wage income they generate in other firms. Both an increase in government 
spending and an employment subsidy could rectify this failure, one by raising the 
firms' revenues, the other by reducing their labour costs.  
   But the proposal to increase government spending (the standard Keynesian 
prescription) has major weaknesses: What is the government spending for? If this 
spending is needed to provide the optimal mix of public- versus private-sector goods 
and services, then it should have been undertaken regardless of the unemployment 
rate; and if it is not needed, then resources are being wasted. Moreover, it may be 
possible for firms to respond to the increased government spending by simply using 
their labour and capital more fully, rather than by hiring more workers. In that event, 
the policy compensates firms for something they haven't done.  
    And so we are left with the last policy proposal: to reimburse firms for 
uncompensated benefits by making it cheaper for them to hire new workers.  
    This policy is "potentially appropriate", and not just simply "desirable", 
because the case for government intervention does not just depend on the existence of 
market failures. It also depends on whether political and bureaucratic processes would 
permit the government to intervene in the appropriate way and, if so, what the costs of 
such government intervention would be. If the intervention is likely to be particularly 
inappropriate or costly, the best thing to do is to do nothing at all. 
   In practice there is, needless to say, much more to unemployment and its 
policy treatment than this tale brings to light. Unemployment may have many causes: 
it may be generated be many different market failures. In principle, different market 
failures may call for different policy responses. But many of the unemployment CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     6 
problems that economists have been able to analyse do involve uncompensated 
benefits of the sort described above, calling for policies that reduce firms' labour costs.  
2b. Market Failures Relevant to Training and Unemployment 
    In most advanced industrialised market economies skilled workers have 
significantly lower unemployment rates than their unskilled counterparts. There are 
two conceivable reasons why this should be so: (i) the demand for skilled workers 
(relative to their supply) is greater than the demand for unskilled workers (relative to 
their supply), and (ii) skilled workers have longer employment spans and consequently 
make fewer transitions through the unemployment pool. The explosion of economic 
literature on the labour market effects of skilled-biased technological change and 
globalisation (manifesting itself, in the West, as an expansion of skilled-biased 
international trade) has concentrated on the first reason. But that is not likely to tell the 
full story, for the empirical relation between the relative unemployment rates of 
skilled and unskilled workers (on the one hand) and measured skill shortages is weak 
in many advanced industrialised countries. The second reason above undoubtedly has 
a significant role to play as well.  
   On both accounts, it is useful to examine the market failures associated with 
skill acquisition, particularly those that are also likely to generate unemployment. 
Since unemployment is concentrated so heavily on the unskilled, there is good reason 
to expect that policies addressing market failures in education and training are an 
important ingredient in combating inefficiently high unemployment. They clearly are 
also an important set of instruments for creating more equitable distributions of 
income and wealth.  
   There is a surprisingly widespread belief that the costs and benefits of training 
fall entirely on the people demanding and supplying it. If that were so, the free market 
mechanism would provide an efficient amount of training. If the benefits from training 
fall exclusively on the trainer and trainee and if the trainer and trainee share the costs 
of training in proportion to the benefits they each receive, then training will be 
provided as long as the associated benefits exceed the associated costs. Then the free 
market would allow training to proceed up to the point at which it is impossible to 
make some demanders or suppliers of training better off without making others worse 
off.  CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     7 
     If that were the whole story, all waste in the provision of training would clearly be 
eliminated, and the case for government intervention would be weak. The only 
problem that might remain is one of equity. There may be serious inequalities in the 
acquisition of skills because there are serious inequalities in income and wealth. But 
an appropriate way for the government to address this problem may be by 
redistributing the income and wealth through taxes and transfers, rather than by 
intervening in the market for training.  
  This conventional wisdom received lavish intellectual support from Gary 
Becker's path-breaking and influential analysis of investment in human capital. Becker 
divides on-the-job training into "general" and "specific" components. "General 
training", which is useful to all employers in the economy, is to be financed 
exclusively by the employees. The reason is straightforward. Since all employers 
value this training, there is perfect competition for general skills. Thus general training 
raises not only workers' productivity, but their wages by the same amount. In this way, 
workers are able to recoup fully the benefits from their investment in training. Since 
employers reap none of the benefits from general training, they have no incentive to 
bear any of the costs; but since workers reap all the benefits, they will be prepared to 
accept wage reductions sufficient to cover all the cost of this training.
1 The upshot is 
that workers have just the right incentives to acquire general training; there are no 
market failures here.
2 
  Off-the-job training (for example, education in universities and vocational 
training colleges) also tends to be of the "general" variety. Thus here, too, it is 
appropriate for the trainees to pay for their training.  
                                                 
1 It is not admissible to argue that workers may not be willing to do so, since they may 
not wish to accept deferred consumption associated with current training cost and 
future income increases. The reason is that the wage reductions that they are willing to 
accept are the same in present value terms as the cost of the training, taking into 
account their time discount factors and risk premia. Nor is it admissible to argue that 
barriers to mobility may prevent workers from reaping the full returns from training, 
for in the presence of such barriers, the training would no longer be "general" in 
Becker's sense. 
2 This argument of course presupposes that there are no market failures in the market 
for general training, e.g. no credit constraints that could prevent workers from 
acquiring as much training as they would wish. 
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   At the other end of the spectrum is "specific training" which is useful only to a 
specific employer. The costs of such training are to be shared by firms and workers, so 
that workers internalise the cost of quitting to their firms, and the firms - in turn - 
internalise the cost of dismissals to their trained workers. In either case, the firms and 
workers get compensated for the training, and thus there are no market failures here 
either.  
   In practice, it is tacitly assumed that all training can be divided into general 
and specific components. And since the free market provides adequate incentives for 
each of these types of training, it must do so for any combination of them as well.  
   There is, however, a fundamental flaw in this argument. It is that all training 
cannot be divided into general and specific components. Hardly any training is useful 
to all firms in the economy. Nor is there much training that is useful only to one 
specific firm. Most training, rather, is useful to a limited number of firms, and usually 
not to an equal degree. This straightforward observation has several dramatic 
implications, to be spelled out in what follows. 
2c. Market Failures Associated with Market Power  
2c(1). Market Failures from the Market Power of Firms 
 
   When a limited number of firms are competing for employees, they generally 
have some market power. They use this power to drive wages down. In the process, 
they rob their employees of the incentive to acquire sufficient skills. 
   To see how this works, observe that it is socially efficient (in the absence of 
other market failures) to set the wage so that it is equal to the marginal worker's 
productivity minus her training cost. Specifically, the real wage (the wage deflated by 
the firm's product price) must be set equal to the marginal product of labour, net of the 
marginal training cost (i.e. the output produced by the last employee minus the 
training cost of that employee). The reason why this is efficient is that then labour is 
compensated for the benefit it confers in producing goods and services: what the firm 
pays for the labour is equal to the value of the marginal unit of output produced. At 
the margin, in other words, there are no uncompensated costs or benefits.  CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     9 
   But when firms have market power - and, in particular, when they have more 
market power than their employees -  they are able to drive the wage beneath the 
marginal product of labour net of the marginal training cost. In other words, they off-
load too much of the cost of training onto their employees; or put the other way 
around, the employees may in effect be viewed as paying for too much of their 
training in terms of reduced wages. This, in turn, implies that the employees will have 
insufficient incentives to acquire skills. By implication, they will also have 
insufficient incentives to seek skilled employment and - insofar as skilled vacancies 
are not perfectly elastic with respect to skilled job searchers - thereby the skilled 
unemployment rate is driven suboptimally low while the unskilled unemployment rate 
is pushed suboptimally high.  
   In addition, the firms will fail to internalise enough of the cost of dismissing 
trained workers: since they did not pay enough for training them, they have too little 
incentive to retain them. Consequently too few workers are retained. A low retention 
rate, in turn, means that workers have insufficient chances to remain at the jobs for 
which they trained and thereby capture the return from training. This further reduces 
employees' incentives to train, driving skilled unemployment down and unskilled 
unemployment up. 
2c(2). Market Failures from the Market Power of Workers 
   On the other hand, when employees have more power than their employers, 
they are able to push their wage above their marginal product net of their marginal 
training cost. In that event, too much of the cost of training gets off-loaded onto the 
employers. This means that the employers will have insufficient incentives to provide 
training.  
   Furthermore, the employees will then fail to internalise enough of the cost of 
quitting to their employers: since they did not pay enough for their training, they have 
too great an incentive to quit. When workers have an excessive incentive to quit, they 
once again do not expect to capture sufficient return from their training. So they, on 
their part, will have insufficient incentives to acquire training. Furthermore, since 
some quits take workers from employment through temporary periods of 
unemployment, excessive quitting is associated with excessive unemployment. CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     10 
2c(3). Market Failures from the Joint Market Power of Firms and Workers 
   Of course it is conceivable that the relative market power of employers and 
their employees could be such that the resulting wage provides precisely the socially 
efficient incentive to train. But this could clearly only happen by accident. In practice, 
the presumption must be that this does not occur.  
    But in that event, what is striking about the discussion above is this: 
regardless of whether employers have too much or too little market power relative to 
their employees, the resulting incentives to train will be suboptimally low. In this 
sense, then, imperfect competition in the labour market may be expected to lead to 
deficient provision and acquisition of skills, together with deficient skilled 
employment and (frequently) excessive skilled unemployment. 
2c(4). Market Failures from the Interaction between Market Power and 
Imperfect Information 
   The degree to which incumbent employees, possibly working through their 
unions, choose to use their market power will depend, in part, on the amount of 
training they expect to receive from their employers in response to their wage claims. 
They will, for instance, to exercise restraint in negotiating the wages of their 
employers' new recruits if they anticipate that this restraint would encourage the 
employers to provide ample training for these recruits, thereby raising their 
productivity and wages in the future.  
    But the incumbent employees have imperfect information about their 
employers' training responses to their wage claims. Training activities - particularly 
on-the-job training - are often difficult to monitor objectively. For this reason it is 
often infeasible for employees to conclude formal contracts with their employers 
whereby the new recruits settle for comparatively low wages during their training 
period in return for a specified amount of training to be provided by the employers. If 
the employees do not expect the employers to deliver sufficient training in response to 
low entrant wages, they will choose to use their market power to drive these entrant 
wages up. The underlying reasoning is that if the new recruits would not receive much 
training in any case, there is no reason to exercise wage restraint.  CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     11 
   But in the absence of such wage restraint, of course, the employers have no 
incentive to give the new recruits much training. The reason is that the employers are 
then unable to appropriate a sufficiently large share of the returns from this training. In 
that event, the employees' expectation of deficient training provision by their 
employers becomes self-fulfilling. This problem may be termed the "high-wage, low-
skill trap". There is some evidence that it has plagued Great Britain over the 1980s. 
This trap not only leads to deficient training, but the excessive wages also give rise to 
inefficiently high unemployment among unskilled workers. 
   The argument underlying the high-wage, low-skill trap is not consistent with 
the traditional human capital theory about agents' incentives to acquire skills. In that 
theory, as noted, the trainee appropriates all the gains from general training and split 
the gains from specific training with the trainer in such a way that the social benefits 
from training are internalised. In that event, the employer either pays a share of the 
training or pays a wage that fully rewards productivity resulting from the training. 
However, in the market failure above, the amount of training provided by the 
employer depends on the entrant wages and the entrant wages, in turn, depend on the 
amount of training that workers anticipate to receive. If workers anticipate little 
training, they have little incentive to keep the entrants' wages at moderate levels; and 
the relatively high entrant wages, in turn, prevent the firms from capturing enough 
return from training and thus induce the firms to provide little training. In this way, 
the workers' anticipations become self-fulfilling.  
2d. Market Failures from Poaching 
   When employees' skills are transferable among a limited number of firms, the 
potential benefits from training accrue not only to the firm providing it and the worker 
acquiring it, but also to other firms that could make use of it. Since the number of 
firms that can benefit from the training is limited, the market for these skills is not 
perfectly competitive. Instead, firms have some market power. When they do, they can 
prevent wages from rising sufficiently for the trainees to appropriate all the return 
from the training. 
   But not only are the trainees unable to appropriate all the returns. The trainer 
and trainee, between them cannot do so either. The reason is that some of the return, 
on average, fall on third parties, namely, other firms that poach the employees once CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     12 
they have been trained. Thus, typically no arrangement whereby the costs of training 
are shared between the training firms and the trainee will provide sufficient incentives 
for training. This is the essence of the poaching externality.  
   The greater is the mobility of workers among firms, the greater will be the 
likelihood of poaching and the lower the incentives for training. Furthermore, the 
greater is the firms' market power in the wage setting process, the smaller will be 
share of the returns from training that the employees can appropriate, and 
consequently the more serious, once again, this problem becomes.  
   These considerations are particularly important with respect to workers who 
are long-term unemployed and/or have a low level of education. The reason is that the 
training they require - basic literacy, numeracy, adoption of effective work habits - is 
likely to be transferable among a far wider set of potential employers than the training 
of more specialised, educated, employed workers. Thus the poaching externality helps 
explain why unskilled unemployment may turn out to be excessive in free market 
economies. 
2e. Market Failures Associated with Imperfect Information 
   The market failures associated with imperfect information may be divided 
into two broad categories: (i) those arising when both sides of the market - the 
demanders and the suppliers of training - are poorly informed and (ii) those 
characterised by an asymmetry of information, where one side of the market is better 
informed than the other, so that the party with superior information may be able to 
exploit its advantageous position. Market failures in the job matching process 
commonly fall into the first category. In this case, skilled workers have imperfect 
information about the availability of skilled vacancies, and the firms offering the 
skilled vacancies likewise have imperfect information about the availability of skilled 
workers. This symmetry of imperfect information is also a feature of the "low-skill, 
bad-job trap" (described in Section 2e(3)).  
    By contrast, market failures arising from imperfect information about the 
content of training (described in Section 2e(1)) belong to the second category. In this 
case, employers have more information about the type of training they provide - and 
consequently about the nature of their employees' skills - than do other firms that 
could potentially make use of the same skills. As discussed below, the current CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     13 
employers may be able to exploit their favourable position by capturing a greater share 
of the returns from training than they would capture under symmetrically imperfect 
information. 
2e(1). Market Failures from Imperfect Information about the Content of 
Training 
   When firms are poorly informed about the attributes of the training provided 
by their competitors, workers' skills - that may be potentially applicable to many 
alternative jobs - become poorly transferable. In the process, workers lose some of 
their incentive to bear the cost of on-the-job training by accepting lower wages during 
their training period, since they have difficulty capturing the reward for this training 
when they switch firms. But if workers do not accept lower wages during training, 
then the firms will have little incentive to train them. In effect, this failure is a high-
wage, low-skill trap initiated by imperfect information about the content of training. 
The excessive wages, in turn, lead to excessively high unemployment among the less-
skilled workers. 
   Another form of this market failure arises when individuals lack information 
about the available vocational training opportunities and about the jobs to which these 
opportunities lead.
3 The amount of information people have in this regard may be less 
than the socially optimal amount, even after the costs of information acquisition and 
dissemination have been taken into account. The reason is that information is a public 
good (possibly an "impure" one, if the above costs are significant). For this reason, the 
free market price of such information is likely to be low and the resulting private-
sector incentives to collect are likely to be correspondingly low. In this case there is a 
potential case for government provision or finance of such information so that, in 
making people better informed about their training opportunities, their incentives to 
acquire skills rise accordingly, stimulating skilled employment and reducing unskilled 
employment. 
                                                 
3 Imperfect information of this sort can turn training that would otherwise have been 
"general" into the firm-specific variety. The reason is that when individuals cannot 
identify the degree to which training provides transferable skills, they cannot locate 
the potential demanders of their skills and are consequently lose market power and, 
with it, the ability to appropriate the returns from training. CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     14 
   In view of the rapidly changing nature of jobs, as technological change and 
international trade continue to transform the labour market, these problems may have 
become particularly serious in recent times and the corresponding need to empower 
people to respond appropriately to their ever-changing job choices in the development 
of their skills may be correspondingly great. 
2e(2). Market Failures through the Market Power Generated in the Job 
Matching Process 
   The process of job matching gives rise to a wide variety of uncompensated 
costs and benefits that are relevant to the decisions to provide and acquire skills. For 
example, as the number of skilled workers in the economy rises, firms find it easier to 
replace the skilled workers whom they currently employ. This gives them a stronger 
bargaining position when wages are negotiated. As they drive wages of skilled 
workers down relative to the wages of unskilled workers, the employees lose some of 
their incentive to acquire skills. This problem is analogous to the market failure 
arising firms' market power; here, in fact, their market power is generated by the 
availability of skilled workers.
4 
   Conversely, as the number of skilled vacancies in the economy rises, skilled 
workers find it easier to switch firms. As a result, the skilled workers' bargaining 
position improves, permitting them to drive their wages up, thereby reducing the 
firms' incentives to provide training. In this case, the market power of workers is 
generated by the availability of skilled vacancies.
5 
    As in the case of the market failures associated with market power, it is 
conceivable that the relative availability of skilled workers and skilled vacancies could 
be such that the resulting relative market power of the employers and employees gives 
rise to wages that provide exactly the appropriate incentives. This, however, would be 
a mere coincidence. In practice, there is no reason to believe relative availability of 
skilled workers and skilled vacancies should generate the socially optimal relative 
                                                 
4 As noted below, this creation of market power gives rise to a market failure only if 
the resulting wage is greater than the level necessary to ensure that the relevant costs 
and benefits from training are internalised by trainer and trainee. CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     15 
bargaining strength between employers and employees and then - regardless of 
whether the resulting wage is too high or too low - there will be deficient incentives to 
provide and acquire training in the economy, leading - along the lines outlined above - 
to excessive unskilled unemployment. 
2e(3). The Low-Skill, Bad-Job Trap 
   In sectors of the economy where there is a small proportion of skilled workers, 
firms have little incentive to provide good jobs (that command relatively high wages 
and require relatively high skills), since such positions would be difficult to fill. 
However, if few good jobs are available, workers have little incentive to acquire skills, 
since such skills would be likely to remain under-utilised and consequently 
insufficiently remunerated.
6 
    The source of this problem is the interaction between two mutually 
reinforcing externalities: a "vacancy supply externality" and a "training supply 
externality". The former arises when an increase in the number of skilled vacancies 
raises the probability that skilled workers find good jobs and thereby raises the 
expected return from training. Thus when a firm creates new vacancies, its private 
return falls short of the social return, since the latter also includes the rise in the 
workers' expected return from training. 
   The "training supply externality" arises when an increase in the number of 
skilled workers raises the probability that firms with good jobs find skilled workers 
and thereby raises the expected return from supplying vacancies. Thus when a worker 
                                                                                                                                             
5 Once again, the workers' market power generates a market failure only if the 
resulting wage is less than the level necessary to ensure that the relevant costs and 
benefits from training are internalised by trainer and trainee. 
6 This market failure is not to be confused with the previous one, discussed in Section 
5b. The previous market failure works through the effect of skills and skilled 
vacancies on the market power of the employers and employees, thereby on the 
negotiated wages, and thereby back on the availability of skills and skilled vacancies. 
The low-skill, bad-job trap, by contrast, works even if wages are invariant to changes 
in the availability of skills and skilled vacancies. The problem in the latter case is 
simply that, in acquiring skills, employees raise their employers' returns from creating 
skilled vacancies and, similarly, in creating skilled vacancies, employers raise their 
potential employees' returns from acquiring skills. Neither the employers nor the 
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acquires training, his private return falls short of the social return, which also includes 
the increase in the firms' expected gain from supplying vacancies. 
   Each of these externalities in isolation would lead the market mechanism to 
provide insufficient training. When both externalities are present simultaneously, the 
market failure is considerably amplified, thereby making a potential case for the 
government to provide additional incentives for the acquisition of skills. Moreover, 
since unskilled jobs are generally associated with higher separation rates, the low-
skill, bad-job trap gives rise to excessive unskilled unemployment. 
2f. Credit Constraints 
    The free market may give people insufficient incentives to provide and 
acquire skills on account of credit constraints. These credit constraints arise because it 
is difficult for individuals - both employers and employees - to insure themselves 
against the risk associated with training. The reasons are what economists call "moral 
hazard" and "adverse selection".  
   The moral hazard problem facing the lenders (e.g. banks) that provide funds 
for R&D-related training is this: The greater the risk premia that the lenders require, 
the greater is the incentive for the borrowers to take greater risks. The reason is that 
the adverse outcomes to the borrower are at worst that of losing the collateral, whereas 
the favourable outcomes are essentially unlimited (since the borrower keeps all the 
returns from the project, after having paid back the principal of the loan plus interest). 
Consequently, the higher the risk premium the borrower is required to pay, the more 
worthwhile it becomes to bear greater risks.  
   The adverse selection problem facing the lenders is similar: The risk premium 
not only affects the borrower's willingness to bear risks on any particular project, it 
also influences the nature of the project itself. The higher the risk premium, the greater 
the incentive the borrower has to choose risky projects. In fact, high risk premia also 
affect the identity of the borrowers. The higher the premia, the more risk-prone the 
borrowers become.  
   Since lenders are generally in a poor position to assess the degree of risk taken 
on a particular project, the riskiness of different projects, and the risk-proneness of the 
borrowers, the lenders have an incentive to use the interest rates on their loans as a 
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keeping the interest rates lower than would be required to clear the market for loans, 
and thereby inducing the borrower to limit their risk exposure. As result, some 
potential borrowers will be unable to find funds for their projects. In fact, the markets 
for certain types of loans may be absent altogether, i.e. no funds are available at any 
interest rate for these projects at all. Vocational training often falls into this category. 
Tapping the credit markets to finance training is particularly difficult because human 
capital - the stock of acquired skills - generally cannot be used as collateral against 
loan default.
7 Insofar as the unemployed tend to be relatively bad credit risks and thus 
relatively likely to face credit constraints, this market failure implies the existence of 
excessive unskilled unemployment. 
2g. Market Failures Generated by Labour Market Institutions 
2g(1). Market Failures from the Unemployment Benefit System and Welfare 
Programmes 
 
    Since unskilled workers are prone to low earning and comparatively long 
spells of unemployment, they tend to impose significant uncompensated costs on 
others via the unemployment benefit system and various welfare programmes. An 
unintended by-product of these institutions is to take earnings from the skilled, 
employed people and give them to the unskilled, unemployed ones. This turns out to 
be a two-pronged attack on the incentive to acquire skills; this incentive is diminished 
both because the skilled, employed people are not fully rewarded for the increased 
productivity generated through their skills, and because the unskilled, unemployed 
people are inadvertently rewarded for remaining unskilled and unemployed. 
2g(2). Market Failures from Tax and Regulatory Distortions 
 
    A closely related problem is that of market failures arising from tax and 
regulatory distortions. Taxes obviously often lead to uncompensated benefits from 
                                                 
7 This market failure can be augmented through institutional failures in the capital 
market, such as the practice of basing loans on collateral rather than on potential 
return. Such institutional failures may, in turn, be due to imperfect competition that 
permits incumbent financial enterprises to be more risk averse in their lending 
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training. When income taxes, for example, appropriate a slice of workers' and firms' 
returns from training, they inevitably make these agents less willing to bear the costs 
of training or search sufficiently hard for the available jobs. 
    Taxes on profits, capital gains, and wealth, as well as tax deductions for 
capital formation, affect the returns to training by influencing the returns to 
investment in physical capital. The more complementary labour and capital are in the 
process of production and the more responsive is product demand to the price rises 
occasioned by these taxes, the more will these taxes reduce firms' incentives to 
provide on-the-job or off-the-job training.  
   Regulations restricting the entry of new firms to the economy will also reduce 
workers' incentives to acquire skills and raise the unemployment rate, since they 
reduce the potential pool of employers competing for these workers and skills.  
2g(3). The Interaction between Education and Vocational Training 
 
   Then there are market failures arising from the interaction between education 
and vocational training. Education and vocational training are generally complements. 
Thus public support for education will influence employers' and employees' returns 
from vocational training. If the support is inappropriate or the education is 
insufficiently relevant to the available jobs, the free market may generate insufficient 
vocational training.   
   Another market failure that can arise in this context is a mismatch between the 
skills required by employers and the available vocational training. Inappropriate 
support for vocational education would lead to the acquisition of skills that are 
insufficiently complementary with employers' skill requirements, or ones that are 
complementary with skills for which there is inadequate market demand. Of course, 
this would encourage the supply of inappropriate goods and services and this supply, 
in turn, would further raise the demand for inappropriate vocational education. 
3. Central Policy Problems and Policy Responses 
    Implicit in the market failures discussed above are guidelines for the 
appropriate policy responses. This section briefly examines a broad range of such 
responses in this light. CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     19 
3a. Demand-management Policies 
   These policies are appropriate when there are significant market failures of the 
sort described in Section 2a. The important point of that analysis is that the 
externalities associated with the Keynesian co-ordination failures do not arise solely in 
connection with the nominal wage-price rigidities that are commonly used to motivate 
the Keynesian macroeconomic theory. Observe that any market failure that makes the 
employed workers better off than the unemployed ones - regardless of whether it is 
generated by the informational asymmetry underlying the efficiency wage theory, the 
labour turnover costs underlying the insider-outsider theory, or the market power 
underlying the theories of union behaviour - will mean that a newly hired worker will 
experience a rise in income, that will be spent predominantly on the products of other 
firms, thereby initiating the Keynesian chain-reaction of externalities.  
   The most direct way of dealing with these externalities are through demand 
management policies, provided that the associated costs in terms of budget deficits 
and change in the relative size of the private and public sectors are sufficiently small. 
These policies fall into two broad categories: (i) government employment policies, 
whereby the government stimulates employment directly by hiring people into the 
public sector, and (ii) product demand policies, which stimulate employment by 
raising aggregate product demand (e.g. through tax reductions, increases in 
government spending on goods and services, or increases in the money supply). 
    The policy challenge here lies in assessing when these externalities are 
sufficiently large to justify a demand-management policy response. In this regard, it is 
important to observe that when these externalities are dominant, recessions will be 
characterised by deficient labour and product demand reinforcing one another: 
workers are unemployed because firms are not producing enough goods and services; 
firms are not doing so because there is too little demand; and demand is deficient 
because people are unemployed. In short, deficient demand in the labour market 
originates in the product market and deficient demand in the product market originates 
in the labour market. Activity in these two markets goes up and down together.  
   This, however, is not always the case. In fact, for most of the 1980s, European 
labour and product markets did not move together at all. Product demand started to 
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in the United Kingdom and even later in most other EC countries. This gap is simply 
too large to be explained by inventory dynamics or lags between inputs and outputs in 
production processes. The Keynesian vision of tightly linked labour and product 
demand is called into question here.  
   A microeconomic problem associated with Keynesian job creation schemes is 
that they are commonly confined to project which would not otherwise have been 
undertaken, in order to avoid displacing private-sector employment. The result, 
however, is that these jobs provide poor training for subsequent employment in the 
private sector. When the people placed on the job creation schemes recognise this 
deficiency, they lose their motivation, which further impedes their prospects of using 
their jobs to find private-sector employment. The Community Programme in the UK 
is a good example of this problem.  
3b. Search-promoting Policies 
    The market failures associated with imperfect information and the labour 
market matching process - discussed in Section 2e - may be addressed by job search 
support and dissemination of labour market information. This policy includes such 
measures as counselling the unemployed, assisting them with personal problems such 
as alcoholism and drug addiction, and alerting them to available training 
opportunities.
8 This approach also involves disseminating information about available 
labour services to firms and about available vacancies to workers.  
   The market failures identified by the efficiency-wage theory provide another 
rationale for this policy. In this context, firms use wages as an incentive device to 
discourage shirking or quitting or to attract high-productivity employees. Clearly 
policies that improve the dissemination of information about workers' ability, 
motivation, and quit behaviour would enable firms to base their wage offers more 
closely on workers' individual productivities and potential labour turnover costs, 
                                                 
8 The EC Commission has laid stress on these measures in combating European 
unemployment. For example, the Council Resolution of 29 May 1990 recommended 
that counselling interviews be made available to all long-term unemployed people. 
There is also wide recognition that these measures are have a chance of being 
particularly effective only if they are combined with other active labour market 
policies, such as training programs. CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     21 
thereby reducing the role of wages as an incentive mechanism and bringing down the 
associated level of unemployment.  
   There is a considerable body of practical evidence pointing to the efficacy of 
this policy approach, if appropriately designed. A good example is the Restart 
Programme in the UK. Under this scheme, the unemployed are interviewed every 6 
months and given advice and assistance. Aside from promoting job search, there is 
also evidence that this scheme has significantly reduced the number of fraudulent 
unemployment benefit claims, for initially about 10% of those invited to Restart 
interviews did not attend and their benefits were stopped. There is little in the Restart 
Programme that makes its effectiveness depend on labour market institutions that are 
specific to the UK and, by implication, this programme seems suitable for export to 
other European countries. 
3c. Mobility-Promoting Policies 
   The market failures stemming from credit constraints (discussed in Section 2f) 
and regulatory distortions (Section 2g(2)) may call for mobility-promoting policies, 
particularly those that are meant to reduce the burden of housing costs to the poor - 
such as rent control or low-cost public housing - reduce worker mobility and, by 
inhibiting workers from moving to the available jobs, create unemployment. This is a 
potentially significant problem in a number of OECD countries containing both 
booming and slumping regions and large house-price and rent differentials across 
these regions.  
   House-price and rent differentials can become an especially serious source of 
"mismatch" in the labour market, since they often expand when the degree of sectoral 
imbalance rises. In particular, the greater is the discrepancy between (a) the excess of 
vacancies over unemployment in the booming regions and (b) the excess of 
unemployment over vacancies in the slumping ones, the greater these differentials are 
likely to be. The reason, of course, is that the greater is the discrepancy in excess 
demand across regions, the greater will the house-price and rent differentials across 
these regions be as well. Thus, as the degree of mismatch rises, the impediments to 
matching may rise in tandem. 
    Rent control and housing subsidies that are tied to the current place of 
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interventions by more efficient ways of redistributing income (such as conditional 
negative income taxes) could therefore help reduce unemployment. A similar 
argument can be made for policies that increase the portability of health insurance and 
pensions between firms. 
3d. Policies Promoting Training  
   In most advanced industrialised countries these policies are characteristically 
targeted at young people (such as Youth Training or Employment Training in the UK, 
or the French apprenticeship programmes and working and training programmes), 
although adult training schemes (such as the Training Opportunities Scheme in the 
UK) are broadly available as well. These policies are required to address a wide 
variety of market failures leading to unemployment of unskilled people, e.g. the 
poaching externality (discussed in Section 2d) and the matching externality and the 
low-skill, bad-job trap (Sections 2e(1,2)). 
   Some of the rise in European unemployment over the past two decades might 
arguably be due to the interaction between the market failures above (on the one hand) 
and the joint pull of skill-biased technological change and international trade (on the 
other). Both technological developments that raise the productivity of the skilled 
relative to the unskilled workers, as well as rising trade with countries that have a 
comparative advantage in producing goods which are relatively intensive in unskilled 
labour, pull in the same direction, in that they reduce the demand for unskilled labour 
relative to the demand for skilled labour. And if the market failures above are 
responsible for a deficiency in the acquisition of skills and an excessive number of 
unskilled workers without jobs, then that technological change and trade could lead to 
a rise in unemployment. 
   In addition, an expansion of trade or an increased rate of technological change 
could generate unemployment by raising the amount of labour market "turbulence", 
particularly by increasing the rate of job creation and destruction.
9 This, of course, is 
not an argument for policies limiting the degree of technological change or trade, for - 
as is well-known - the latter generally permit a given amount of goods and services to 
                                                 
9 As noted, however, there is little evidence that this has actually happened in 
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be produced with less labour input, and thereby could improve everyone's material 
standard of living, provided that the appropriate redistributions from the winners to 
the losers can be made without substantial loss of efficiency. Rather, the above 
diagnosis is an argument for job search support in order to improve the effectiveness 
of the matching process. 
   In response to the problems above, government training programs or training 
subsidies to the unemployed - particularly the long-term unemployed - may have a 
role to play in combating unemployment. Many government training programs, 
however, are ill-suited to firms' needs. This is scarcely surprising, since these needs 
are extremely diverse while government training programs are inevitably standardised 
and limited in variety. In this regard, training subsidies granted to firms appear 
preferable, for the firms then have the incentive to make the resulting training 
maximally appropriate to their available jobs. To keep firms from illicitly diverting 
the training funds to other purposes, it may be necessary to provide the training 
subsidies only for programs leading to nationally recognised qualifications, granted by 
institutions independent of the firms receiving the subsidies.
10 
3e. Low-Wage Subsidies and Payroll Tax Reductions  
   These set of policies - implemented in minor ways in both France and the UK 
- are meant to address the problem that, in many OECD countries, the relative position 
of workers at the bottom of the earnings distribution has worsened over the past two 
decades. This deterioration has taken the form of lower relative real wages in the US 
(and, to a lesser degree, in the UK) and higher relative unemployment rates in many 
continental European countries. Providing subsidies or payroll tax reductions to low-
wage workers is meant to raise firms' demand for these workers, thereby reducing 
their unemployment rates and raising their take-home pay.
11 
    Since these policies reduce unemployment by reducing employers' labour 
costs at the bottom of the wage spectrum, their effectiveness does not appear to be 
very sensitive to the precise underlying cause of the unemployment (in contrast to 
                                                 
10 The German apprenticeship system has both of these ingredients. 
11 The effectiveness of these policies on these variables clearly depends on the 
elasticity of labour demand. The greater the elasticity, the more the unemployment 
rates of the low-wage workers will fall and the less their take-home pay will rise. CREATING EMPLOYMENT INCENTIVES     24 
profit-sharing subsidies). For example, regardless of whether the unemployment is 
generated by union pressures, efficiency wage considerations, or insider-outsider 
conflict, a drop in labour costs is bound to raise employment, since it permits firms to 
substitute labour for capital and enables them to reduce product prices and thereby 
create more demand. 
   A drawback of these policies is that, by raising the take-home pay of unskilled 
workers relative to skilled workers, they reduce the returns to training. Insofar as 
labour and capital are complementary in production, the resulting fall in human capital 
acquisition may also lead to a fall in physical capital formation. For this reason, it 
appears desirable that these policies be supplemented by subsidies to education and 
training. This additional element, however, would substantially increase the cost of the 
intervention. Another drawback is that these policies may encourage excessive 
creation of unsatisfying, dead-end jobs, providing little potential for advancement. In 
that event, the unemployment trap would be replaced by the "trap of the working 
poor". But even in that event, workers would experience a rise in their living 
standards: since the take-up is voluntary, workers and firms will avail themselves of 
these policy measures only if it is to their advantage. 
3f. Reforming the Unemployment Benefit System 
    Among the West European countries, the UK has experienced relatively 
thorough attempts to reform the unemployment benefit system, largely by reducing the 
value of the benefits and raising eligibility requirements. These reforms may be 
rationalised as addressing a market failure generated by unemployment benefits 
themselves (discussed in Section 2g(1)). Specifically, unemployment benefits 
discourage job search (because when an unemployed person finds a job, the 
unemployment benefits are withdrawn and taxes are imposed) and put upward 
pressure on wages (by improving incumbent workers' negotiating positions).  
   The critical question in reforming the unemployment benefit system is how to 
provide a safety net for the disadvantaged and the poor without severely reducing 
people's incentives to fend for themselves. As a rule, European policy makers have 
felt that, given their equity objectives, people at the low end of the wage distribution 
need welfare state assistance. The same consideration also applies to the unemployed, 
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the low-wage employed people. The upshot is that the unemployed have little 
remaining incentive to move into low-wage employment. Since that is the type of 
employment most commonly available to the unemployed - particularly the long-term 
unemployed - the disincentive to work becomes severe.  
   This disincentive is masked by replacement ratios. The conventional measure 
of these ratios is the average unemployment benefit divided by the average wage. 
Thus unemployed people may have no incentive to return to work even when the 
replacement ratio is low. The reason, of course, is that the "replacement ratio" relevant 
to most of the unemployed is the ratio of the unemployment benefit to the average 
wage at the low end of the wage distribution (e.g. the bottom decile), rather than the 
average wage overall. 
   Moreover, labour market deregulation of the UK variety, for any given level 
of unemployment benefits, is likely to make this problem worse. For deregulation may 
be expected to lead to a widening of the wage distribution and consequently to a fall in 
the unemployment benefit relative to the new average wage at the bottom decile of the 
wage distribution. 
   Tightening the eligibility requirement for unemployment benefits (as in the 
Netherlands and the UK) may be also expected to aggravate this problem. The more 
stringent is the test of willingness for work, the lower will be the wage that people 
exiting from unemployment will on average receive (ceteris paribus). For example, 
when the UK introduced a new work criterion in 1989, requiring the unemployed to 
seek work outside their previous occupation and pay range, these people were given 
an increased direct incentive to find work, but a reduced indirect incentive. The reason 
is that the average wage received by people exiting from unemployment fell relative to 
a variety of welfare state benefits guaranteeing a minimum standard of living. 
    Finally, reducing the coverage of unemployment benefits after short 
employment spells (as in France), further reduces work incentives. If unemployed 
people no longer receive benefits after brief periods in a job, then they gain the 
incentive to "invest" in longer-term unemployment. 
3g. Equity-Efficiency Trade-offs 
   In most European countries, a person is entitled to unemployment benefits for 
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variety of welfare state benefits. The combination of these two policies means that 
people - particularly if they are poor - are granted, within limits, universal, 
unconditional and unlimited benefits. For example, in the UK the Unemployment 
Benefit is available for a year and is followed by Income Support. These two 
payments are of about the same order of magnitude, except that Income Support is 
means-tested whereas the Unemployment Benefit is not. Analogous conditions prevail 
in France, where unemployment benefits are succeeded and supplemented by RMI 
(the Minimum Integration Income). Consequently, poor unemployed people 
frequently face severe disincentives to seek work. This is the source of a important 
trade-off between equity (assuring that people's standard of living does not fall below 
a specified minimum level) and efficiency (preserving people's incentives to seek 
work). 
    A different variant of this problem appears in the presence of generous 
disability benefits, such as those in the Netherlands and the UK. Since disability 
benefits are higher than unemployment benefits in these countries, people who lose 
employment in their 40s or 50s and who perceive themselves as having little prospect 
of finding further jobs, have a strong incentive to exit from the labour force and join 
the ranks of the disabled. The rapid rise in the number of disabled in the Netherlands 
and the UK over the past decade and a half, without evidence of a comparable rise in 
health problems, indicates that this attempt to preserve the living standards of the 
disadvantaged has a high efficiency cost. 
    Another equity-efficiency trade-off arises through the behaviour of the 
spouses or partners of the unemployed. Insofar a unemployment benefits are means-
tested (as in the case of the Job Seekers Allowance that is to be introduced in the UK 
in October 1996) or the subsequent welfare state benefits are means-tested (which is 
the case in most European countries), the job loss of one person affects the job search 
incentives of that person's partner. Since the receipt of benefits depends inversely on 
the partner's income, it is clear that when one adult member of a household becomes 
unemployed, the partner gains an incentive to become unemployed as well. Once both 
people are unemployed, the incentives to return to work become strong only if both 
receive job offers simultaneously. But the probability of that happening are, clearly, 
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3h. Benefit Transfers 
   Over the past few years, a number of advanced market economies - Australia, 
Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK - have experimented with diverse variants of 
the "Benefit Transfer Programme" (BTP). The underlying idea is to give the long-term 
unemployed people the opportunity to use part of their unemployment benefits to 
provide vouchers for firms that hire them. The longer a person is unemployed, the 
greater is the voucher. Larger vouchers are also granted to firms that use them entirely 
on training. Once the worker finds a job, the voucher gradually falls as the period of 
employment proceeds.  
   The BTP is designed to address a wide variety of market failures that lead to 
excessive real product wages and hence to deficient employment. These market 
failures, for example, include those generated by asymmetric information as in the 
efficiency wage theory or by market power as in the insider-outsider or union theories. 
   Although various existing policies, such as the UK Workstart pilots or the 
French co-operation agreements (which give an allowance to employers of previously 
unemployed people), are superficially similar to this proposal, none of them fulfils all 
of its critical provisions. Neither the French nor the British variants have explicit 
sanctions against displacement of incumbent employees, making this policy approach 
socially divisive and thus robbing it of significant political support. In the French 
variant, the allowance to the enterprise is equal to the remaining amount of benefit for 
the worker in question. Thus the scheme is biased toward the short-term unemployed 
(for whom the amount of remaining benefits is relatively high) and against the long-
term unemployed. Thereby the scheme aggravates, rather than mitigates serious labour 
market inequities. In the UK the scheme is restricted only to the very long-term 
unemployed (i.e. those unemployed for over two years). Here people become eligible 
for subsidy only after they have become significantly dissociated from the labour 
force.  
   Needless to say, the effectiveness of the BTP depends critically on how it is 
designed, specifically, on how many of its provisions are adopted. To date, the various 
attempts to implement it have all omitted several important provisions and thus are 
seriously misdesigned. The design errors all magnify the factors that limit the 
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(subsidies or tax reductions received by workers who would have become employed 
anyway), (ii) "displacement" (incumbent employees displaced by the subsidised new 
recruits), and (iii) "substitution" (firms that benefit from the policies driving firms that 
don't benefit out of business).  
    An evaluation of the underlying idea awaits a more determined effort to 
capture the underlying spirit of the programme. 
3i. Unemployment and Training Accounts 
  My proposal is to create unemployment and training accounts (UTAs). Under 
this programme, every employable person would have an unemployment account to 
provide support against job loss and a training account to provide funding to acquire 
new skills. Instead of paying taxes to finance unemployment support, further 
education and training, employed people would be required to make regular 
contributions to their UTAs. The mandatory contributions would rise with their 
incomes. To maintain the living standards of the poor, the government would pay 
contributions of the lowest income groups, and tax the contributions of the higher 
income groups. People could also make voluntary contributions in excess of these 
amounts. 
  If people become unemployed, they could make limited withdrawals from their 
unemployment accounts instead of receiving unemployment benefits. If they wished to 
acquire skills, they could draw on their training accounts instead of receiving 
government grants, subsidies, and loans. If their UTA balances fell below a specified 
limit, they would receive public assistance on the same basis as under our current 
system. If their UTA balances became sufficiently high, they could use the surplus 
funds for other purposes. At the end of their working lives, their remaining UTA 
balances could be used to top up their pensions. 
  People would be able to borrow money on favourable terms for their training 
accounts, enabling them to finance their training through their future incomes. 
Unemployed people who develop promising job market strategies at their Restart 
interviews could receive government loan guarantees when they borrowed training 
account money. Employers’ contributions to training accounts would receive 
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  People would be free to make withdrawals from their training accounts at any 
point in their working lifetimes. Those who identify their preferred careers early in 
their working lives may draw substantially on their accounts soon after leaving 
secondary school. Those who take longer to find their niche in the labour market, or 
those who require retraining upon changing occupations, would make significant 
withdrawals much later in their careers. In this way, the training accounts would 
enable people to remain employable and adaptable throughout their working lives. 
  The UTAs would initially be managed largely on a Pay-As-You-Go basis 
(similar to saving accounts, from which people can make withdrawals even though the 
banks use most of the money for other purposes). With the passage of time, the UTAs 
would eventually be turned into a fully funded system, where individuals would have 
discretion over who could manage their UTAs. To guard against bankruptcy, the 
financial activities of the private-sector UTA fund managers would be regulated, 
along lines similar to the regulation of commercial banks. 
  Adopting the UTA system could substantially reduce the level of long-term 
unemployment and promote skills. In particular, moving from unemployment benefits 
to unemployment accounts would give people greater incentives to avoid long periods 
of unemployment. For the longer people remain unemployed, the lower will be their 
unemployment account balances and consequently the smaller the funds available to 
them later on. And since the unemployment accounts generate more employment than 
unemployment benefits, the unemployment account contributions necessary to finance 
a given level of unemployment support would be lower than the taxes necessary to 
finance the same level of unemployment benefits.  
  Furthermore, the training accounts would be better suited than the current 
education and training programmes to ensure people’s lifetime employability, since 
the accounts could be accessed whenever employees and their employers found it 
maximally worthwhile. In this way, employers and employees stand to gain from the 
switch to UTAs. Retired people would gain through their ability to use their UTA 
balances to augment their pensions. And the government would gain, since the 
removal of the distortions from unemployment benefit system would promote new 
economic activity and thereby generate increased tax revenue. Beyond that, the UTAs 
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poor, since unemployment benefits and training schemes are not targeted exclusively 
at the poor, whereas government contributions to UTAs would be.  
  In order to provide additional incentives to find work and acquire the relevant 
skills, the government would provide subsidies for long-term unemployed people who 
use their UTAs to provide recruitment vouchers or training vouchers for firms that 
hire them. The size of each person’s voucher would depend on his wages earned over 
next two years of subsequent employment. The recruitment vouchers would reduce 
firms’ cost of employing the long-term unemployed; the training vouchers would 
reduce the cost of training them. The subsidies would be set so that they could be 
financed through the tax revenues from people’s first two years of subsequent 
employment and through the abolition of in-work benefits. 
  In short, replacing the current system by UTA would reduce unemployment 
and simultaneously promote equality. While people are generally resentful of their tax 
burden and often demeaned by the existing unemployment benefits and training 
programmes, they would be more willing to contribute to personalised accounts for 
their own purposes. The UTAs would give people more freedom to use 
unemployment support and training funds to meet their diverse individual needs. It 
would give them greater latitude to respond to changing job opportunities, finance 
periods of job search, acquire skills, and provide for retirement. And all this could be 
done without creating greater inequality or increasing government expenditure.  
3j. Conditional Negative Income Taxes 
  The previous proposals were predominantly concerned with promoting 
prosperity by making the provision of state services more efficient. We now turn to 
proposals that are primarily aimed at promoting social cohesion through the 
redistribution of income. On the whole, most countries conduct such redistribution in 
exceedingly inefficient ways, needlessly reducing incentives for employment and 
production and imposing unnecessary burdens on governments’ budgets. 
  This section considers a promising, largely untried, policy alternative: the 
conditional negative income tax. To put the advantages of this policy into sharp 
perspective and to illustrate what the negative income tax should be “conditional” on, 
it is useful to view it as replacing a current redistributive policy, such as the current 
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negative income tax would be analogous to those attached to current unemployment 
benefits. For instance if, under the current unemployment benefit system, people must 
provide evidence of serious job search in order to qualify for unemployment benefits, 
then they must also be required to provide such evidence under the proposed 
conditional negative income tax system; If unemployment benefits decline with 
unemployment duration under the current benefit system, then so too must the 
negative income taxes.   
  The broad argument in favour of this switch from unemployment benefits to 
negative income taxes is that this policy could meet the equity and efficiency 
objectives of current unemployment benefit systems more effectively than the 
unemployment benefit systems themselves. Although conditional negative income 
taxes would generate the same type of policy inefficiencies as unemployment benefits, 
the former would tend to do so to a lesser degree than the latter. For example, negative 
income taxes may be expected to discourage job search, but by less than 
unemployment benefits, for when a worker finds a job, he loses all his unemployment 
benefits, but only a fraction of his negative income taxes.  
  It is worth noting that a major criticism of the traditional negative income tax 
schemes - namely, that they make people's material well-being less dependent on 
employment and thereby discourage employment - obviously doesn't apply to 
conditional negative income taxes, since these taxes are conditional on the same 
things as current unemployment benefits.  
  Furthermore, conditional negative income taxes also tend to be more effective 
than unemployment benefits in overcoming labour market inefficiencies generated by 
credit constraints (e.g. people being unable to take enough time to find an appropriate 
job match or unable to acquire the appropriate amount of training on account of credit 
constraints), since the presence of these constraints is more closely associated with 
low incomes than with unemployment.  
  Against this, conditional negative income taxes are by their nature less 
effective than the economic theorists' socially optimal unemployment insurance 
schemes in overcoming efficiency problems in the unemployment insurance market 
(such as the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection). The reason, of course, is 
that conditional negative income taxes are designed to reduce people's risk of poverty, 
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conditional negative income taxes with socially optimal unemployment insurance 
schemes is generally small, since the unemployment benefit systems operative in most 
OECD countries do not to have much in common with the central features of optimal 
unemployment insurance. One reason is that most of the existing unemployment 
insurance schemes either impose ceilings on benefits are a these benefits as flat rates, 
while optimal unemployment insurance does not have is property. In many European 
countries, the duration of unemployment benefits is not closely tied to the previous 
span of employment, which optimal unemployment insurance would clearly do. 
Moreover, the relative contributions of employers, employees, and the government to 
the current unemployment insurance schemes bear little if any relation to the social 
costs that these agents fail to internalise.   
  Given that unemployment benefit systems in practice have little in common 
with the main features of optimal unemployment insurance, the efficiency case for the 
unemployment benefit systems is considerably weakened. What remains, then, is the 
equity case; but here - as we have noted - unemployment benefits tends to be less 
effective than conditional negative income taxes.   
  Finally, the unemployment benefit system has the well-known advantage that 
since it is more narrowly targeted than a conditional negative income tax system 
which provides a similar level of support for the target group, the unemployment 
benefit system tends to be less expensive. Specifically, the unemployment benefit 
system requires a lower level of tax revenue to finance a given level of support for its 
target group than does the conditional negative income tax system. This disadvantage 
of conditional negative income taxes versus unemployment benefits must be set is the 
advantages noted above. Should the disadvantage prove to be overwhelming in 
particular instances, policy makers may wish to target the conditional negative income 
taxes in the same way as the unemployment benefits are currently targeted. 
 4. Concluding Thoughts 
   This paper has argued that the appropriate way of thinking about the need for 
employment policies, and of formulating these policies once the need is apparent, is 
through the analysis of the underlying inefficiencies or inequities. If a particular policy 
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market failures that the policy is meant to correct, (ii) to evaluate the government 
failure associated with the implementation of the policy and (iii) to assess whether the 
market failure outweighs the government failure. Only if the market failure is large 
relative to the government failure is there a case for an efficiency-promoting 
employment policy. On the other hand, if a particular policy is meant to correct an 
inequity, we need (i) to assess the efficiency cost of this correction and (ii) to 
investigate whether alternative policies could achieve the same equity objective at 
lesser efficiency cost and (iii) to opt for the policy associated with the most favourable 
equity-efficiency trade-off. 
    Needless to say, these assessments are extremely difficult to conduct in 
practice, for a very simple reason. Both market failures and government failures 
intrinsically involve losses to which the market mechanism attaches no price. It is, in 
fact, because the market sets no price that the various market failures emerge and 
because the market the market imposes no price on the resulting government 
interventions that the government faces no political need to pay the cost of the 
government failures. And where the market sets no price, quantitative valuations of 
costs are necessarily problematic. 
   Nevertheless, the difficulty of evaluating market and government failures does 
not give us an excuse to stop thinking about these magnitudes, simply because the 
efficiency case for employment policies, as well as the equity-efficiency trade-offs 
they generate, cannot be made on other grounds. 